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INTRODUCTION
As the tech giants’ influence has grown, they have increasingly
become arbiters of truth. On their platforms, policies to promote
community safety result in the removal of hateful or inciting content, but
are malleable enough to envelop other unpopular viewpoints.1 To skirt
widespread criticism from their mostly free speech-embracing users, and
to curate their platforms to be more subjectively palatable, companies
have resorted to adjusting the exposure of certain voices rather than flatly
censoring them.2 The subjectivity of their policies has also resulted in
concerted total bans between the large companies on speakers who,
however distasteful to many, resonate with a large portion of the
electorate.3
* J.D. Pepperdine University School of Law 2020
1
Menlo Park, The deciders: How social-media platforms dispense
justice, THE ECONOMIST, (Sept. 8, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/business/2018/09/06/how-social-media-platformsdispense-justice.
2
Id.
3
Id.
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Such an ability to target and oust voices from the political
community reasonably raises eyebrows among those who share
traditionally liberal values. Traditional American civics brings unpopular
voices to the table and then holds a vote. Criticism from unpopular
viewpoints is either disregarded after being heard, or used constructively.
The modern tech giants—Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and Google—in
their role as guardians of information, may be beginning to part ways
with this model. They are to credit for the vast democratization of
expression and information. Yet the ages-old hubris they once seemed to
diffuse could prove a specter difficult to escape.
It is a reasonable dilemma in which they should find themselves.
Their platforms can be used as brush for the fires of compassion and
violence alike. They can be used to radicalize disaffected young people
just as easily as to raise awareness for a human rights issue or to bring
attention to a serious flaw in a political candidate.4 It is easy to see why
the companies would feel a need to discriminate according to content or
even speaker. The First Amendment also protects their right to do so.5
But the slippery slope of content regulation exists just as much with
privately owned fora as with government fora.6 The question is whether
the tech giants came to play such an important role in a political
discussion that their power to subjectively moderate content poses a big
enough civic problem to warrant government action; and secondly,
whether such an action is effective.
This comment explores three principal methods for curbing the
tech giants’ speech curation, whether they would be effective, and
whether they would be justified. And of course, the option of doing
nothing. The First Amendment, though its spirit is the very object of
legislatures’ protection, prevents the government from usurping the
companies’ ability to decide what to circulate.7 Legislatures must tread
lightly, directing their efforts at peripheral abuses, rather than presuming
to compel objectionable viewpoints. Finding violations of antitrust law,

4
SÉRAPHIN ALAVA, DIVINA FRAU-MEIGS & GHAYDA HASSAN, YOUTH
VIOLENT EXTREMISM ON SOCIAL MEDIA: MAPPING THE RESEARCH 32
(Andreea Ernst-Vintila et al. eds., 2017).
5
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6
Defending Free Speech in the 21st Century, CATO DAILY PODCAST
(Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.cato.org/multimedia/cato-daily-podcast/defendingfree-speech-21st-century.
7
U.S. CONST. amend. I
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leveraging the firms’ “neutral platform” status, and perhaps even digging
into the nuances of the First Amendment present methods for doing this.
One of the surest methods to ensure a vibrant diversity of
thought and opinion might be antitrust law.8 At almost no time in history
have so few firms controlled so much market share in a widely used
industry.9 Governments have acted to spark competition before.10 At the
beginning of the twentieth century, the United States broke up
monopolies in energy and railways, and at the end of it, in technology.11
Though it has diminished in recent decades, antitrust could be applied to
foster competition in a marketplace of speech platforms. Different
speech-policy frameworks would compete for use, their merits inevitably
distinguishing them, allowing all the more viewpoints to breathe. The
looming boundaries of acceptable speech would decentralize, in keeping
with our founding Enlightenment principles. This would also not prevent
platforms from excluding content they abhor, nor would it preclude the
government from prosecuting genuine threats, terrorists, or otherwise.12
It would, however, dislodge the cultural stranglehold that the selfappointed shepherds of expression now hold, insofar as it does not reflect
widespread, organic culture.
The distinction between regulation as a neutral platform and as a
publisher also has dire implications for social media companies. Neutral
platforms are absolved of liability—be it copyright, tort, etc.—for all
content posted by their users.13 They are seen as neutral intermediaries,
having played no role in the speech at issue, other than to have facilitated
its exposure to other users.14 They must do this in a definitively neutral
way to qualify for the liability exemption.15 Publishers, by contrast,
engage in the curation of content; their right to do so in whatever way
they see fit is legally acknowledged.16 Because publishers play an active
role in deciding what may and may not be sent into circulation or bear
their imprimatur, they are liable for the bale of content they ultimately
8

The next capitalist revolution: Competition, THE ECONOMIST, Nov.
17, 2018, at 13.
9
THE ECONOMIST, supra note 1, at 52.
10
THE ECONOMIST, supra note 8, at 13.
11
THE ECONOMIST, supra note 8, at 13.
12
Nicole Phe, Social Media Terror: Reevaluating Intermediary
Liability Under the Communications Decency Act, 51 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 99,
131–32 (2018).
13
Id. at 109.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 110.
16
Id. at 106. See also U.S. CONST. amend. I.

38 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW VOL. XIII:I
produce.17 At the moment, social media companies are considered
neutral platforms, free from liability for users’ posts, yet they also
engage in curation.18 They are thus potentially deserving of a publisher
classification.19 Exactly where they fall concerning this boundary has not
been established with much clarity.20 The government could leverage
that fact to keep the tech giants’ influence at bay.21 However, that might
not be enough to effect a long-term, reliably even-handed, and clear
approach to the companies’ content regulation. And it would require
constant monitoring and allegations of unfair ideological discrimination
against them.22 Even then, the tech firms might be right to call the
government’s bluff. Subjecting these companies to liability for their
users’ content could shut them down overnight, a result that could be
perceived by voters as worse.23 A world with no social media might
sound like a long-awaited respite, but the enormous economic and
political detriments of their vanishing make it politically unviable.
Congress could perhaps carve out liability parameters specifically for
social media companies, though they would need to withstand First
Amendment challenges.24 There is also the political will to hold social
media platforms accountable for the content they present for its own
sake.25 In recent years, for example, Facebook was used to facilitate the
Rohingya genocide in Myanmar, and to crush dissent there and in
China.26
A more circuitous and less likely route for restraining the tech
giants from unduly altering American civics, but perhaps ultimately
sturdier, is interpreting First Amendment rights of users as powerful
17

Phe, supra note 12, at 106.
Sam Levin, Is Facebook a publisher? In public it says no, but in
court it says yes, THE GUARDIAN (July 3, 2018, 2:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jul/02/facebook-markzuckerberg-platform-publisher-lawsuit.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Phe, supra note 12, at 106. See also Levin, supra note 18.
26
Paul Mozur, A Genocide Incited on Facebook, With Posts From
Myanmar’s Military, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/technology/myanmar-facebookgenocide.html.
18
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enough to override certain company decisions. Though the First
Amendment restrains governments and not private companies, the
common law has construed several doctrines that might be of use to
platform users.27 The doctrines state that the government may regulate
speech in a viewpoint-neutral way within spaces it designates as official
fora.28 Prager University is attempting to pry this doctrine a bit wider by
suing YouTube for censoring its videos.29 The case builds on the First
Amendment grounds that in offering itself as a public platform on the
internet, YouTube became a state actor and thus is subject to censorship
stipulations.30 There is some common law indication that such fora could
even be under private ownership if designated for public use and
subjected to viewpoint-neutral government regulation—such as requiring
that the fora be viewpoint-neutral themselves.31 If Facebook were
considered a public forum, for example, around an election as in
Minnesota Voters’ Alliance v. Mansky, the government could intervene
with its standards for the speech allowed.32 However, this would not
necessarily ensure a wider array of voices; it could even shrink the
amount of content permissible around election time, as it did in
Mansky.33
Even after postulating all approaches, many claim doing nothing
is the wisest course. Markets tend to self-correct,34 and there is no reason
to presume the speech-platform market should be any different.
Alternative platforms, like Patreon, Ello, and Diaspora, spring up with

27

Id.
See e.g. Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S.Ct. 1876,
1885–86 (2018) (holding that regulation of political speech around election
booths at election time was permissible because they are “non-public fora.” The
opinion leaves open whether private establishments could ever be designated
public fora as well.); (holding that regulation of pamphlet distribution is
permissible in airports because they are “non-public fora.”).
29
Mike Jayne, Fairness Doctrine 2.0: The Ever-Expanding Definition
of Neutrality Under the First Amendment, 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 466, 493
(2018).
30
Id.
31
Mansky, 138 S.Ct. at 1876 (2018).
32
Id.
33
Id. Though many who decry fake news might favor the goal of
quelling information around election time, classical liberals, and all red-blooded
Americans, should not. Id.
34
See Mark J. Perry, Free Market, Though Imperfect, Is SelfCorrecting, AEI, https://www.aei.org/carpe-diem/free-market-though-imperfectis-self-correcting/.
28
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increasing frequency.35 Competition should accommodate an everwidening swathe of viewpoints, and eventually reinstate the robust
democracy our forefathers intended. This is not without merit; however,
even the framers abhorred the extra-governmental centralization of
power, viewing it as an equal threat to democracy.36
Part II of this comment describes in depth the relationship social
media companies are forging with the modern world, including the
dilemmas they face, the steps the firms take to resolve them, and the
tangible effects of these approaches. Part III outlines the solutions: a
principled laissez-faire approach, its virtues and its hazards; an expansion
of First Amendment doctrine and its viability; the peripheral but potent
approach of antitrust law; and finally, the touchiness of reform in the
distinction between publishers and neutral platforms. The array of legal
routes toward curbing tech companies’ undue influence on American
civics is wide but not unnavigable. The purpose of this comment is to
provoke consideration of the free speech principle and determine how, or
whether, to apply it to public companies that have become civic
platforms. It examines the stakes liberalism faces in the twenty-first
century.

I.

CURRENT AFFAIRS: BIG TECH’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
MODERN WORLD

A. The Companies’ Dilemma
The dilemma tech firms face is real. Complicity in a widening
scope of atrocities became possible by the ubiquity and adaptiveness of
their products.37 The persecution in recent years of the Rohingya ethnic
group in Myanmar, as well as the military’s grip over the population, was
largely inflamed by the military’s deliberate and insidious use of

35
See e.g. Jody McCutcheon, 7 Alternative Social Media Sites We
Hope Will Crush Facebook, ELUXE MAGAZINE,
https://eluxemagazine.com/magazine/alternative-social-media-sites/.
36
Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa Price, Monopolies and the
Constitution: A History of Crony Capitalism, NW UNIV. SCH. OF L. SCHOLARLY
COMMONS (2012), at 75. [Hereinafter Calabresi].
37
Mozur, supra note 26.
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Facebook as a fount of disinformation.38 Facebook eventually acted to
quell that government’s abuse of the company’s platform, but the
military had already done massive damage.39 There is a distinction
between misrepresenting facts, as was done in Myanmar, and spewing
abrasive opinions stateside.40 But this distinction is often trickier to
identify than it might seem. Most disinformation campaigns and
psychological warfare deliberately blend some truth with their lies,
making them more effective and less detectable.41 That all is to say that
the curation that the big tech firms engage in is capable of great material
good, and the subtlety of its execution might be more important than first
meets the eye.42
Easier than probing and uncovering hidden webs of
disinformation is blocking express propaganda from known terrorist
groups.43 That type of content moderation is likewise more widely
understood as a good thing.44 ISIS’s videos are known for being effective
at appealing to their audience, and tech companies are encouraged to
target them.45 They would face a backlash for not doing so.46 What
separates that conduct from the targeting of voices at home that those at
company headquarters subjectively feel threatened by, or construe as
related to violence when they’re not? The presence of a force that is able
to make those determinations for such a wide swathe of people, without
being beholden to the constitutional procedures and principles those
people have struggled to institute, is a threat. Though the firms’ decisions
might currently be generally agreeable, and though the firms are
accountable to a marketplace, it does not obviate the underlying ethical
duties evidenced by the people’s laws and Constitution. Whether it is
reasonable for tech firms to exert force on a given political situation is a
38

Id.
Id.
40
See also Sara Salinas, Twitter permanently bans Alex Jones and
Infowars accounts, CNBC (Sept. 6, 2018, 4:45 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/06/twitter-permanently-bans-alex-jones-andinfowars-accounts.html. When Alex Jones was banned, however odious he may
be too many, Twitter spoke about transparency and then gave no specifics at any
point, only opaquely saying that he had violated community guidelines. Id.
41
Mozur, supra note 26.
42
Id.
43
Phe, supra note 12, at 100.
44
See id.
45
Id. at 123.
46
Id. It is of note that the transgression in such cases is rarely the
spreading of false factual information, but is based more on ideological
difference, as well as a fear of material violence. Id.
39
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different question from whether it is wise in the abstract to give them the
power to do so.
B. How They Monitor: What’s Actually Going On?
It is important to first be informed on the actual practices of
speech moderation the companies engage in. Whether Facebook,
YouTube, Twitter, Google, and the like involve political viewpoint in the
way they program their content-moderation algorithms is suspected and
hypothesized with varying amounts of evidence.47 The claim that they
overtly target conservatives is just shy of having resounding proof.48 But
what is also likely is that problematically malleable content-review
standards are interpreted in an ideological light, advertently or
inadvertently, resulting in a double standard between voices competing
on the platforms.
There is a great deal we do know about the procedures and
guidelines the firms use to moderate content. Facebook’s content
moderation, for example, happens on numerous levels.49 It happens
either before the content is published (ex ante) or after (ex post).50
Moderators can either curate reactively (once content is brought to their
attention), or proactively (scouring the pages for improper content).51
Finally, these methods can all either be automated or manual.52
Ex ante content can be moderated automatically in a matter of
seconds.53 For example, an algorithm will reference an image, against
“hashes” or signatures of known copyrighted, or something worse like
child pornographic images, and detect if the uploading image is a version
of it; they can then block its publication.54 The software that ultimately
makes the judgment to prevent publication is regularly subject to updates

47

What Is “Shadowbanning”?, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 1, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/08/01/what-isshadowbanning.
48
Id.
49
Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and
Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1630 (2018).
50
Id. at 1636.
51
Id. at 1630.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 1636.
54
Id.

2019

MINISTRIES OF TRUTH

43

and machine learning.55 Content that users tend to flag can become part
of the software updates.56
As for manual, proactive ex post moderation, it is pretty much
only done for terrorist speech.57 A series of guidelines are established
based on decisions committees make about which content to leave up
and which to take down; those decisions form the basis for the guidelines
that trickle down to moderating teams.58 Manual, reactive ex post
moderation is done either according to the company’s established
guidelines or as a reaction to users flagging content.59 The ability of users
to flag content benefits the company both in that it is a practical way of
reviewing vast amounts of content, and it assuages concerns that the
company’s moderation methods are unilateral.60 Because there is still
obvious room for inappropriately subjective bases for regulating content
when users flag, such as arguments between opposing viewpoints,
Facebook funnels flagging through a system designed for users to resolve
conflicts themselves.61
This is the point, when the moderators begin discriminating
flagged content for preclusion or publication, at which the companies’
opacity on the issue becomes more unsettling. Not a single large
company published its guidelines for determining which content gets to
stay and which must leave.62 Additionally, the guidelines change more
frequently than even the terms of service.63 This further obfuscates the
firms’ moderation practices, and further skirts any recourse for their
users.
55

Id. at 1637.
Id.
57
Id. at 1638.
58
THE ECONOMIST, supra note 1.
59
Klonick, supra note 49, at 1638.
60
Id.
61
Id. For example, a user reporting content will be prompted to select
“Report/Mark as Spam,” and then select why he or she feels it is such through
buttons like, “Hate Speech,” “Violence or Harmful Behavior,” or “I Don’t Like
This Post.” Id. They even allow users to report certain content to their friends
and family if it is harassment or self-harm threats, and triage different types of
threats so they can be attended to appropriately (terrorism or suicide before
harassment or pornography). Id.
62
See Catherine Buni & Soraya Chemaly, The Secret Rules of the
Internet: The Murky History of Moderation, and How It's Shaping the Future of
Free Speech, THE VERGE (Apr. 13, 2016),
https://www.theverge.com/2016/4/13/11387934/ internet-moderator-historyyoutube-facebook-red-ditcensorship-free-speech.
63
Id.
56
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Judging the flagged content against these mysterious guidelines
are actual human beings—Facebook employees organized into three
tiers.64 Tier 3 comprises the day-to-day monitors, who interpret
guidelines to the best of their ability.65 Tier 2 moderators supervise those
on Tier 3, and review content that was “escalated” or prioritized, such as
credible threats of suicide, terrorism, or imminent violence, as well as
types of content interpretation of which was inconsistent.66 Tier 1 are
lawyers and policymakers at the company’s headquarters.67 It is much
like our system of court appeals in the United States: if there is a
discrepancy in the way a certain type of content is treated by different
Tier 3 moderators, then progressive tiers step in to standardize the
decision making.68 In the early days, moderators were recent college
graduates in the San Francisco Bay Area, but now the job has been
largely outsourced to third-parties, many in the Philippines, Ireland,
Mexico, Turkey, India, and Eastern Europe.69
The company’s Community Standards provided to the public are
just a framework, the general motivators of regulatory action.70 The real
determiners of regulatory outcomes, though, stem from the internal
rulebook under those Standards, and precedents past moderators have
set.71 These are complete with all the principles and multi-factor tests of
common law judging.72 They are unlike common law, however, in that
decisions do not reason directly off past decisions but instead only use
them by analogy.73 Those internal rules and precedents remain opaque to

64

Klonick, supra note 49, at 1639.
Id. at 1639–40.
66
Id. at 1640.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 1641–42
69
Id. It is interesting to note that these moderators are not Americans,
with instinctively American approaches to distinguishing certain types of speech
rights. This is a double-edged sword: moderators are both less conscious of
American speech rights, but also less conscious of domestic biases. See Adrian
Chen, Inside Facebook's Outsourced Anti-Porn and Gore Brigade, Where
‘Camel Toes’ are More Offensive Than ‘Crushed Heads,’ GAWKER (Feb. 16,
2012), https://gawker.com/5885714/inside-facebooks-outsourced-anti-porn-andgore-brigade-where-camel-toes-are-more-offensive-than-crushed-heads.
70
Klonick, supra note 49, at 1641–42
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 1642.
65
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the public.74 Much training is done to the outsourced employees to
provide consistency in moderation when each enters the profession with
their own cultural biases and norms.75 This is a rather involved process,
instilling the cognitive perception necessary to override cultural or
emotional reactions to the instinctual level of arriving at a resolution that
“chicken sexers” possess.76 This is effective; lawyers and judges exhibit
a fraction of the bias that non-lawyers do in solving politically triggered
legal questions.77 The guidelines for relevant content require that certain
types of information be excluded from the decision-making process,
mirroring, for example, the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Once the procedural rules are followed so that the relevant
information is identified, the actual Abuse Standards are applied.78 This
starts with a list of nine per se bans on content, enumerated, but also
containing many exceptions.79 Images of blood, exposed bone and
tendon, and crushed heads or limbs (but only those in which insides are
showing) are banned.80 On the ideological side of the ban list, hate
symbols like swastikas or images of Hitler or Osama bin Laden are
automatic violations, “unless the caption (or other relevant content)
suggests that the user is not promoting, encouraging or glorifying the
[symbol].”81 In some respects, the guidelines for the social media
companies are more specific and less subjective than American First
Amendment jurisprudence. For example, the legal test for obscenity from
Miller asks whether the normal person applying contemporary
community standards would find the material appeals to the prurient
interests, whether it depicts conduct defined under law in a patently
offensive way, and whether it lacks serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value.82 The company’s rules are far more specific.83 Aside
from that, the guidelines provide a list of protected categories of people,
and somewhat echoing American jurisprudence, distinguishes between
ordinary people, public figures, law enforcement officers, and heads of

74

Id. at 1663.
Id. at 1642.
76
Id. at 1643. See also Richard Horsey, The art of chicken sexing
(2002), http://cogprints.org/3255/1/chicken.pdf.
77
Klonick, supra note 49, at 1643.
78
Id. at 1644.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 1644–45.
81
Id. at 1645.
82
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
83
Klonick, supra note 49, at 1647.
75
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state, factoring in whether they fall within these protected categories.84
Defining and choosing categories of people to protect raises concerns
about subjectivity.
Perhaps one of the most important things to understand about the
content moderation in which tech firms engage is that the internal rules
they create are in constant flux.85 It might compound the concern the
public has about the rules’ opacity. There are four ways in which the
rules can be subject to change: (1) government request, (2) media
coverage, (3) third-party civil society groups, and (4) individual users’
use of the moderation process.86 The theory behind the categories
allowed to influence the moderation “government” is that it is pluralistic:
there are multiple external factions of equal force competing to influence
it.87 Although pluralism sounds valuable and democratic in theory, it can
lead to undemocratic results in practice.88
Government Requests: In general, tech firms give governments
what they ask for within a given country and remove content, even if it is
not in violation of their policies.89 For example, YouTube sometimes
only geo-blocks content within a country.90 Facebook, by contrast,
removes content globally, if compliance requires.91 Twitter, by yet
another contrast, typically refuses to capitulate to political requests,
although it does remove content that clearly violates a country’s laws.92
Other times, Twitter removes part of the content for other reasons, such
as impersonation.93 Tech firms were criticized for too often acquiescing
to government requests, but, conversely, they developed entire antiterrorism departments and policies.94 No content whatsoever is allowed
from terrorist groups, even if it is unrelated to terrorism, and hundreds of
thousands of terrorist-related accounts have been terminated.95
84

Klonick, supra note 49, at 1645.
Buni, supra note 62.
86
Klonick, supra note 49, at 1649.
87
Id. at 1649.
88
Id. at 1650.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 1651.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 1651.
95
See Joseph Menn & Dustin Volz, Exclusive: Google, Facebook
quietly move toward automatic blocking of extremist videos, REUTERS (June
85
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Media Coverage: The media do not have a direct role in altering
the content that appears on social media platforms.96 But when media
coverage is coupled with either the collective action of the platform’s
users or a public figure’s involvement, platforms were responsive.97 That
is to say, the media spurs collective action of users that ultimately leads
to a change in policy by the platform.98 This happened when Facebook
removed images of women breastfeeding, same-sex kissing, 19th century
nude paintings, and doll nipples.99 Because trust in the platforms’
services is largely based on the democratic principles of their users,100 it
follows that the platforms should be responsive to collective, publicized
complaints voiced in the media. This, however, can have an adverse
effect on democratic values because those with more clout can crowd out
voices espousing minority opinions.101 For instance, the platforms only
take down information that violates their policies when more
journalistically well-known users post relevant information.102 When the
regular uses post information that violates the platforms’ policies, the
problem is not addressed.103 While sometimes problematic, this
methodology also has merit in other contexts. For example, Mark
Zuckerberg decided to allow content that would otherwise violate the
Facebook’s policies when it is of public importance, which allowed
content from the Trump campaign that otherwise would not have been
allowed.104 Criticisms that Facebook was not applying its terms of
services equally and fairly had more credence, given the fact that the
company was able to alter them in a way that adhered to the current
political need.105 The less immutable the policies, in other words, the less
credible the principles that underpin them.
Third-party Influences: Although organizations like the AntiDefamation League and the “Working Group on Cyberhate” do not exert
24, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-internet-extremism-videoexclusive/exclusive-google-facebook-quietly-move- toward-automatic-blockingof-extremist-videos-idUSKCN0ZB00M.
96
Klonick, supra note 49, at 1652.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 1652–53.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 1653.
101
Id. at 1650.
102
Id. at 1655.
103
Id.
104
Id. See also Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook Employees Pushed to
Remove Trump's Posts as Hate Speech, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2016),
http://on.wsj.com/2ePTsoh.
105
Klonick, supra note 49, at 1655.
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any official force on the social media platforms, they have a special
relationship, wherein the platforms know that content these organizations
flag is serious and should be looked at right away.106 Akin to perhaps an
amicus brief or the policy work of think tanks, third-party organizations
exert a more concentrated influence on the social media platforms.107
This can be due to their expertise and research, but it also raises concerns
that ideological viewpoints concentrated in these organizations could
have unfair sway over the actual philosophical consensus of the
population because even the consensus can marginalize voices.
The final substantial method that can yield change in moderation
policy is the users’ own content flagging and the subsequent decisions
made about them.108 This facet is perhaps most similar to the common
law system. As issues arise, where no two are quite alike, the outcomes
of those decisions end up shaping policy.109 This assuages concern about
the subjectivity of the constant policy updating because there can, in fact,
be a legitimate reason for it. What differentiates this facet from the
common law system is that companies also maintain efforts to preempt
certain situations before they arise like when other, new situations occur
that might trigger their awareness of a certain issue.110 For example, the
decision that certain disturbing content may be displayed in connection
with its relevance—political or otherwise—to the public, arose from a
series of similar actual situations flagged on social media platforms.111
This all is to say that the tech giants put a considerable amount
of resources into the fairness of their moderation process. They also put a
considerable amount of energy into keeping rules up to date with current
political needs, which is conspicuous and leads to confusion among the
regulated speakers.112 The issue is whether the opacity that does exist,
given the jurisprudence is not published for the public, deals with
something that affects so many people that a lack of transparency could
pose a civic problem. Is this such a big part of our lives that the public
has a right to know what the guidelines are? Even if the current
governors of information are as benevolent and liberal as they say, what
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do citizens have to assuage their worries about a future with such
consolidated power?113
C. Real-World Effects
Knowledge of the mechanisms and stated motivations of content
moderation are useful; however, more powerful is knowledge of the
effects of moderation around the world. They can be both detrimental
and beneficial, both political and economic.
The political benefits reach both first- and third-world countries.
As described above, social media monitors have targeted disinformation
aimed at interfering with elections.114 Though allegations that foreign
disinformation campaigns played any determinative role in the 2016
presidential election have no confirmation, what is confirmed is that
much disinformation was indeed peddled by accounts in different
countries, like Russia.115 Many advertisements targeted American
cultural divisions—such as an image of Satan and Jesus arm-wrestling on
behalf of opposing candidates; an image stating that the U.S. government
dismantled the Black Panthers, yet the K.K.K. exists today; a
Confederate flag and a call for the South to rise again; attacks on Hilary
Clinton via promotions of Bernie Sanders; other ads attacking Donald
Trump; others stoking hatred on both sides of the Black Lives Matter–
police divide; and a buff, gay Bernie Sanders.116
On February 16, 2018, a notorious Russian “troll farm,” known
as the Internet Research Agency (IRA), received an indictment from
Special Counsel Robert Mueller.117 This conspiracy was operative as far
back as two years prior and used stolen identities of U.S. citizens to
usurp domestic credibility.118 The indictment included allegations that
the organization staged political rallies, and bought political
advertisements in the names of U.S. citizens.119 The Committee Minority
113
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released a list of Twitter accounts associated with the IRA to bring
awareness to the public of the risks of disinformation.120 The striking
thing about the Internet Research Agency case is the level of complexity
allegedly wielded by the disinformation peddlers.121
“[The Russian] social media campaign was
designed to further a broader Kremlin objective: sowing
discord in the U.S. by inflaming passions on a range of
divisive issues. The Russians did so by weaving
together fake accounts, pages, and communities to push
politicized content and videos, and to mobilize real
Americans to sign online petitions and join rallies and
protests. Russia exploited real vulnerabilities that exist
across online platforms and we must identify, expose,
and defend ourselves against similar covert influence
operations in the future. The companies here today must
play a central role as we seek to better protect legitimate
political expression, while preventing cyberspace from
being misused by our adversaries.”122
Furthermore, 3,393 advertisements were purchased, exposing
more than 11.4 million American users to them, 470 IRA-created
Facebook pages appeared, and, in response, 80,000 pieces of organically
created content, which in turn reached over 126 million Americans.123
Twitter was allegedly even worse, with more than 36,000 Russian-linked
bot accounts tweeting about the U.S. election, approximately 288 million
impressions of Russian bot tweets, and more than 130,000 tweets by
accounts linked to the IRA.124 Aside from the Russian influence
campaign, other nefarious accounts sought to mislead voters about the
election by posting incorrect dates and information related to voting.125
Although it is extremely difficult to measure how such
advertisements affected the election, it is reassuring to many that the
social media platforms have the power to slow down the spread of
factually inaccurate information, or debatably even foreign opinions
aimed at changing the minds of American citizens about their elections.
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At the same time, permeability to information and opinions from all over
the world ought to be an American strength. Nonetheless, other benefits
of the ability to regulate information include disruption of free-flowing
propaganda surrounding the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya people of
Myanmar, and the cracking down on all terrorist propaganda currently
pouring out of the Middle East, for which the companies receive
criticism for taking too long.126
Political detriments resulting from the social media companies’
conduct reach first- and third-world countries alike. The same attention
the firms pay to disinformation also spread into the more subjective
realm of ideology. Even when a speaker is only stating his or her
opinion, it may run afoul of the companies’ hate-speech criteria. For
example, both the “Proud Boys” and Alex Jones were subjects of
concerted social media bans, labeled far-right conspiracy theorists and
even racists, with no semblance of due process; former group, for
example, has members of different races and sexual orientations among
its ranks.127 Whatever their political label or their theories, they are
citizens whose beliefs were their own, and whose threat to others was
inferred by a block of people within a different, specific political camp.
As the objective during the election was to minimize foreign
interference, it seems somewhat contradictory to limit these
quintessentially domestic groups in expressing themselves for lack of
being palatable to their opponents. Not only did the social media
companies ban the group because some of its members had gotten in a
brawl on a New York City street—readily qualifying it as a “hate group”
when the very group they were brawling against, Antifa, is an
empirically far more violent group of masked thugs incidentally bent
Leftward—but they admittedly banned any support and praise when they
become aware of it.128 That is to say, they remove opinions about the
group that differs from the moderator’s own.129 This is especially
egregious considering that this was not limited to opinions condoning the
dreadful things of which the group is accused, but include opinions that
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the group does not, in fact, condone them.130 It is unequivocally clear that
company members did not like the group’s message substantively. The
group’s message is offensive to some, as their two qualifications for
entry are being male and “loving the West.” Yet their “counterpart”
Antifa is far more violent, engages in masked beatings of outnumbered
victims on camera, and enjoys the luxury of multiple Facebook pages.131
Although the firms’ discretion has proved helpful in some
humanitarian crises, its potential for power concentration has also
compounded them. During the Rohingya genocide in Myanmar, before
the companies reacted to public pressure, the military’s ability to
manipulate the population was greater than ever before, as the public
lacked adequate channels of information.132 In China, Facebook was
more than willing to abide by the Communist Party’s censorship
guidelines, though ultimately that relationship was thwarted by the
current United States-China trade war.133 “I think it’s hard to have a
mission of wanting to bring the whole world closer together and leave
out the biggest country. At some point, I think that we need to figure it
out, but we need to figure out a solution that is in line with our principles
and what we want to do, and in line with the laws there, or else it’s not
going to happen,” said Mark Zuckerberg.134 While his remarks signal the
company’s desire to spread across the globe and provide access to
information, they also indicate a willingness to curb that very
information.
Assaults on free speech in Europe are also exacerbated by the
platform’s complicity, though to a lesser degree. In Europe, where free
130
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speech takes a more compromised seat than it does in the United States,
social media companies only change the application of their policies
slightly to be in line with explicit legal differences. The differences are
much subtler between the United States and Europe than they are
between the United States and China, for example, and the difference in
application mostly hinges on users’ liability in their respective countries.
In Austria, for example, the European Court of Human Rights invoked
“religious peace” as a reason to limit criticisms of the Prophet
Mohammed by way of an Austrian anti-blasphemy law that effectively
gives credence to the religious beliefs of some simply because they
would use violence to defend those beliefs.135 Specifically, the criticism
surrounded the prophet’s marriage to Aisha, a six-year-old.136 In
Scotland, comedian “Count Dankula” was convicted for posting a joke
video in which he trained his girlfriend’s dog to raise his paw in salute in
response to the words “Sieg Heil.”137 The video was not taken down;
however, the sizeable audience that the judge thought might be offended
by it was pivotal in the comedian’s conviction.138 Germany already
imposed fines of up to £50 million on social media companies that do not
delete illegal content within twenty-four hours of being notified.139
The benefits and detriments of the tech giants are not relegated
to politics. They also find economic forms in both first- and third-world
countries. The benefits of curating content can actually be quite practical
for tech companies. Because the Internet is chaotic in nature, sites can
gain an edge by making information organized and palatable to their
users.140 As the quantity of the information has grown, the quality has
decreased.141 The trust companies can build up with consistency and
good judgment can help set them apart from their competitors, and also
135
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make the Internet more useful to users.142 Conversely, demonstrating too
strong of a bias can make a company less marketable, but only in a
society that values objectivity. Though that trust can certainly be abused,
which is the issue with institutional grips on markets, there is a certain
degree of confidence one can have that the market will keep companies
somewhat trustworthy—not necessarily in being objective or accurate,
but in giving voice to different segments of that market.143 It also makes
the market of information more efficient in that it delivers the desired
information directly to those who want it without the need to sift through
it.144
II.
SOLUTIONS
A. The Principled, Laissez-Faire Approach, and the First
Amendment
The case is often made that the free market will ultimately keep
whatever slant on information exists consistent with the values of the
population—that this is democratic, and perhaps is itself the way in
which meritorious ideas percolate as a free society intends. Who is the
government to regulate how information must be disseminated into the
public? Though the free market of ideas has its own problems and at
times may not seem equitable, its problems are minor compared to those
that occur once coercive force is introduced as acceptable in a society—
even in the name of equity, which it often is.145 If certain views are
outnumbered, and are even ousted, from the fora, then those with the
ousted views can simply set up another forum elsewhere.146 This is an
argument that most people can follow and are proud to identify in their
surroundings, queue references to George Orwell’s 1984.147
Though this idea seems to exalt the traditional values America is
known for around the world, it appears convoluted from another angle.
The very spirit of the First Amendment is to protect against abusive
majorities; the main way to do this is to properly restrain democratically
142
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elected institutions of power. The other side of the coin sees that the
heckler’s veto in America is actually prohibited, and police are required
to protect the right of minorities to speak, even in face of public mobs.148
This affirmative obligation the Constitution bestows on the government
to protect minority speech is not captured by the hands-off approach
many advocate as the intellectually consistent way to keep the market of
ideas fair. It is important to remember that the First Amendment also
does not prevent Congress from passing an act of equity if it does not
override anyone’s right to free speech. In that light, the task at hand
should be to formulate a way to protect minority speech from censorship
by government and non-government actors, while steering clear of First
Amendment rights.
But if there are groups that claim they are not given exposure to
the market through social media firms, and if so many people, as they
claim, are receptive to their ideas, then why do they not simply create
their own platforms? A number of right-wing speakers and writers who
felt their voices were stunted on the main channels of Twitter, Facebook,
YouTube, and [less so] Instagram have sought platforms elsewhere.149
“Patreon,” for example, a website which “allows creators like you to
have a direct relationship with your biggest fans, get recurring revenue
for your work, and create on your own terms,”150 is a platform to which a
number of voices flocked.151 The platform’s selling point is that content
creators have a direct line to their fans; they can charge monthly
subscriptions themselves or charge pursuant to a specific project.152 This
flexibility allows the content creators to tailor their exposure and
financing to their own needs.153 It ostensibly makes the platform itself a
less powerful force in the interaction. Another advantage that Patreon
offers is more freedom from the pressure that accompanies advertising
148
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dollars.154 Because our day and age is one where commercial boycotting
is a response to ever-subtler political disagreements, companies and
content creators are forced to be concerned about any political
implications their messages might have.155 For example, YouTube
recently encountered trouble when advertisers rescinded their business en
masse upon discovering that their ads were being placed without their
permission before videos they found objectionable.156 In reaction,
YouTube placed tighter restrictions on the definition of “advertiserfriendly” content, and in turn many content creators found that their
advertising revenues were hit.157 For those creators who are not yet wellfunded and are subject to the pull of corporate advertising policies and
brand partnerships, Patreon provides a platform to be freely connected to
their fan base.158 This initially drew in a lot of content creators who felt
persecuted by larger companies.159 The only catch was that they still had
to be acceptable to Patreon.160 The voices that tried to find refuge,
instead, only found subjection to the same type of guidelines they
originally fled.161 And so the question remains: why don’t those voices
rejected by Patreon simply take out a loan, pay a tech person, and
establish platforms that comport with their points of view?
The argument in response is that this same sort of discrimination
simply takes place on ever-deeper levels. Even in a global market replete
with expression platforms for every voice, there still exists an arbiter at
some level who determines which platforms may even secure a domain
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name. Many odious websites have been denied domain names.162 Their
odiousness, however, should not detract from the leeriness appropriate
for a context in which so few have the power to decide what is seen. It
seems advantageous that genuinely dangerous content could be censored
independently without the expense of state resources. When we have
clear conviction not to let government monitor our content, yet desire
threatening content out of our midst, private monitoring appears to be an
answer.
But a larger question remains: is a system of numerous discrete
platforms, each with different content strictures, civically healthy? Isn’t a
fundamental merit of free speech the utility of ideas converging and
conflicting and the consequent separation of the wheat from the chaff?
Exposure to those odious messages is perhaps precisely what can diffuse
them and is arguably one of the factors in America’s relatively high
degree of domestic political peace. If a liberal democracy should
determine for itself what it detests, doesn’t that first require
knowledge?163 If we are to bind together as a nation, even a nation that
respects small, insulated communities, it does not follow that the
decisions we must make together should occur in ignorance about the
way each other group thinks. The value of public fora is just that: they
are public. The participation of every citizen makes them more
meaningful, more legitimate, and more powerful. That is to say, it is not
necessarily un-American to place a civic scaffolding underneath the free
market of ideas to ensure a free debate of conscience that is not skewed
by disproportionately involved sectors of society.
There are some who question whether counter-speech is
adequate to right the wrongs of misinformation.164 They point to the 2016
presidential election and discussion surrounding “fake news” and
question whether the doctrine, first articulated by Justice Louis Brandeis
in Whitney v. California, can be as complex a remedy as the problem it
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aims to fix.165 Specifically, they inquire into the structural and economic
changes that affected the news media: increased fragmentation and
bubbles, and increasingly algorithmically disseminated information, and
how these affect the spread of news in ways that might make it more
difficult for legitimate news to faithfully triumph over fake news.166 This
does assume, however, the objectivity of the term “legitimate,” and
accordingly overlooks one large premise of free speech: that no one has a
monopoly on even the definition of that word.
“If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and
fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be
applied is more speech, not enforced silence,” opined Brandeis in
1927.167 He was right that enforced silence is not the wise government
remedy, but this opinion does not speak directly to today’s issue.
Today’s issue, instead, is the facilitation of falsehood and alteration of
the very marketplace that allows meritorious ideas to percolate. This
issue directly threatens the premise of Brandeis’s opinion. In plainer
terms, the speech on the platforms is not free in the first place but should
be. Expanding public forum doctrine under the First Amendment to
include social media platforms could remedy this, but the road is rocky.
B. Antitrust Law
Perhaps a sounder way to attack the problem, rather than by
interpolating constitutional rights would be antitrust law. America, as
well as its British predecessors, always abhorred monopolies.168 This
abhorrence adapted to its time—first starting with a rejection of
government-granted monopolies, but eventually losing its roots in noninterventionism to instead become simply anti-monopoly.169
A brief history will inform the application of antitrust in the
modern age. Darcy v. Allein, also known as the Case of Monopolies, was
the first to abolish the practice of the government’s giving exclusive
rights to produce any article.170 Before then, cases of royal monopoly
165
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grants were shielded from the common law and only heard instead in the
royally administered Court of Star Chamber.171 In striking down a
monopolist’s stranglehold on trading cards, the court opined that trades
avoiding idleness was “profitable for the Commonwealth” even “to serve
the Queen” and therefore state-established monopolies were “against the
Common Law, and the benefit and liberty of the subject.”172 This is still
valid law today. By the time the British colonists liberated themselves
from this parasitic form, the egregious waste of government-granted
monopolies was firmly in the population’s knowledge.173
From this long struggle to throw off state oppression, the same
anti-monopoly sentiment evolved in the new United States—especially
as the twentieth century commenced.174 At the Founding, many including
George Mason and Thomas Jefferson wanted to secure a right against
monopolies in the same way the right to free speech was later secured in
the Bill of Rights.175 However, this was tempered with the recognition,
most prominently by Madison, of a need to secure the rights of private
individuals for their own works, specifically in art and science.176 After
some compromise, our current constitutional framework ,with regard to
monopolies, was agreed upon, which included the right to grant
monopolies: only within the areas of science and art; only to the authors
and inventors themselves, rather than to anyone who wanted to control
an industry; only for grants with limited timeframes; and with the
implied caveat that the monopolies would only be for the purpose of
securing the fruits of those authors’ labor rather than for government
enrichment.177
The idea of freedom from monopolies came to the fore in the
“Slaughter-House Cases” interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
privileges and immunities clause.178 “No state shall make or enforce any
English people out of entire trades. Those engaging in the royally monopolized
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law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States.”179 Though obviously directed primarily at the deprivation
of citizenship of former slaves, the amendment also encompassed other
abuses that individual states exacted upon the free citizens of the
country.180 Slaughter House did not extend it so far, however, and only
interpreted those rights already enumerated in the Constitution as being
protected from abridgment by the states.181 Because freedom from state
monopolies was not a property of American citizenship, but rather of
citizenship of that state, the smaller ones were allowed.182
Later, this arrangement prompted larger, federal action by
President Theodore Roosevelt, who effectively extended the consumer’s
right to be free from monopolies to include freedom from anticompetitive conglomerates in general.183 In the 1890s, the explosion of
industry and economic efficiency that the new, classically liberal world
order brought to Europe and America, came to be seen as leaving
consumers (which, when extended to modern-day also includes political
participants) open to abuse in their day-to-day lives that previously only
governments had been able to achieve.184 The abuses called for a
modification in the definition of “monopoly” to also include private
monopolies—both those that developed without special grants from the
state, and products of “crony capitalism.”185 At this time, anti-monopoly
sentiment may also have grown, in part, because there were so many new
inventions—ones that we today consider commonplace ideas—that were
still protected by patents. Reason would not have confused this with the
swelling consolidation of private interests pulling state governments in
one direction or another, but perhaps politics would have. Analogously,
land monopolistically granted by the federal government upon which
railroads were built was actually a traditional sort of monopolistic
problem (government-grant), rather than simply a problem of pure
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largesse, success, and political sway.186 Nonetheless, they stoked the
same popular wrath. Senator Charles Sumner, a radical Republican and
abolitionist, described monopolies as not only hostile “to the Union,” but
also “as hostile to the spirit of the age, which is everywhere overturning
the barriers of commerce.”187
Those who opposed the railroads did not restrict their antimonopolistic sentiments to that industry.188 They also generally opposed
all of the large trusts, like Standard Oil and the large steel companies,
simply on the ground that their sizes jeopardized liberty with the constant
threat of government corruption.189 Although it may be a fallacy to
suggest that the government’s corruptibility is a function of the success
of its citizens, a better case can be made that inequality itself poses a
threat to liberty.
The practice, and corresponding Act, with the most bearing on
today’s giants, though, was that large companies had the power to drive
out competitors and drive up prices.190 It is normal and healthy for
companies to increase their market share, and restraining this directly as
the means of benefitting the consumer is often more wasteful and
illiberal than necessary. However, when companies are able to do this to
box out competition, rather than simply by having a genuine competitive
edge, this certainly harms the majority of people.191
The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 was directed at preventing
privately established restraints on trade and at regulating cartels that
emerged, particularly in the railroad industry.192 This was acknowledged
as somewhat of a paradox: that the government, in the name of consumer
welfare, and ultimately liberty, would intervene into the private
market.193 Twenty-four years later, the 1914 Clayton Antitrust Act and
the 1914 Federal Trade Commission Act were both passed to reinforce
the Sherman Act.194 By this point, culturally, the United States entered
the “Progressive Era,” and the fundamental arguments about the proper
role of government, which underpinned the extension of anti-monopoly
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sentiment into the private sector, were less fiercely debated.195 History
shows there is certainly precedent, both legal and societal, for limiting
forces that bear disproportionately on civic and economic matters.196
Another modification in the definition of “monopoly” is not needed, only
an extension in our understanding of its application.
Americans in the earlier two centuries of our history shared a
negative view of monopolies, but that vehemence waned.197 Accordingly,
and because the modern-day tech companies pose a substantially
unprecedented obstacle, the current antitrust framework has narrowed.198
The Sherman Act’s purpose was pointed, because it was passed against
the populist concerns of its day.199 A similar backdrop is needed today.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “anticompetitive
practices that are used to build and maintain market power,” and
invalidates “every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, in conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.”200 Section 2
prohibits the formation of monopolies and the activities that monopolize
trade.201 Section 2’s broad language divided courts.202 Standard Oil v.
United States provided some clarity as to what exactly the statute
prohibits, but not much: the “rule of reason” it produced stated, “[T]o
leave it to be determined by the light of reason, guided by the principles
of law and the duty to apply and enforce the public policy embodied in
the statute, in every given case whether any particular act or contract was
within the contemplation of the statute.”203 This rule tended to focus on
public welfare, which later per se included prohibiting collusive pricing,
market divisions, group boycotts, and cartelization.204 Rule of reason
jurisprudence outside the per se categories considers the restraint on
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trade, “its context, purpose, and effect,”205 taking into account “the nature
of the industry, the reasons that the restraint was imposed, and whether
or not it has the desired consequences.”206 The Clayton Act of 1914 then
gave needed specificity to antitrust enforcement procedure by defining
the prohibited conduct.207 It added predatory pricing strategies to the list
of prohibited activities, and strictures for mergers and acquisitions.208
“Non-price” vertical restrictions were later added to the mix.209
The Chicago School then narrowed the rule of reason to focus on
prohibiting inefficiency, rather than focusing on civic well-being.210 The
School heavily influenced the Supreme Court in the last quarter of the
twentieth century.211 Restraints on trade, as long as they were “efficient,”
became more legally acceptable.212
A return to the original interpretations of the Sherman Act would
help society’s cause against abusive tech firms. Originally described as
an economic “bill of rights,”213 the Sherman Act recognized that true
freedom required the proper legal instrumentation, and that nations are
civic societies as well as economies.214 Anticompetitive behavior harms
present competitors, and disincentivizes new ones to innovate and come
to market;215 but fewer companies with larger market shares can become
“too big to fail,” and intertwine themselves with democratic institutions
to the peril of both.216
The tech giants are currently able to dance carefully within
Chicago School jurisprudence, for example by keeping prices low to give
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the appearance of efficiency.217 But the approach has resulted in less
competition, higher prices, and fifty percent less small-business
ownership.218 Giant tech firms crowd out competitors, increasing prices
and lowering wages.219 As the market share of the top four has increased,
the number of new entrants has decreased and productivity growth has
been weak, likely explained by a lack of competitive pressure to
innovate.220 The firms create barriers to entry by buying prominent
competitors, sharing users’ data across their own subsidiaries, and
restricting advertisements.221 Big tech may be anticompetitive, especially
if the definition were to broaden.
Applying these antitrust principles with a mind to quell speech
censorship would be effective. Although it is not directly justified on
speech-censorship grounds, that end could be achieved by regulation that
would facilitate competition, and inevitably allow the expression of
different viewpoints. Antitrust could be accompanied by intellectual
property regimes that liberate individual users to take their information
where they please, and by requiring big platforms to license anonymized
bulk data to rivals.222 Additional barriers to entry such as non-compete
clauses, occupational licensing requirements, and complex regulations
written by industry lobbyists could also be made less stringent, with a
mind to ultimately increase competition and thereby expression.223
C. Platform/Publisher Distinction
The large tech companies understand the precarious state of their
image and livelihood. Although they grew enormous and powerful, their
existence still acutely depends on relatively nuanced aspects of their
perception, as well as nuanced aspects of the law. They tread lightly,
dodging antitrust transgressions, and they tiptoe around the distinction
between neutral platform and publisher so as not to incur liability for
their users’ content.224 When Mark Zuckerberg testified in front of the
217

Kahn, supra note 207, at 738.
The next capitalist revolution, supra note 8, at 13.
219
Id.
220
Id.
221
See Foge, supra note 197, at 120–21.
222
The next capitalist revolution, supra note 8, at 13.
223
Id.
224
See Alina Selyukh, Section 230: A Key Legal Shield For Facebook,
Google
Is
About
To
Change,
NPR
(Mar.
21,
2018),
218

2019

MINISTRIES OF TRUTH

65

Senate in April of 2018, he was asked flatly whether Facebook was a
publisher; his answer was notably less direct.225 Presumably well
counselled, he instead diverted his answer into one about feeling
responsible for users’ content, and being a “platform for all ideas” rather
than a neutral platform.226 The purpose of this was to steer clear of any
trouble with Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.227
The Communications Decency Act was enacted in 1996 for the
purpose of fostering the growth of Internet companies by protecting
internet service providers (“ISPs”) from liability from screening content
on their platforms.228 Congress wanted to foster the growth of the young
Internet by minimizing government regulation and giving power to new
Internet companies themselves to monitor and screen for objectionable
content without the constant fear of incurring liability.229 It was based on
the assumption that Internet companies need unbridled immunity to
survive.230 Prior to its enactment, the common law used a system of three
categories to determine liability: primary publishers, distributors, and
conduits.231 Newspapers, bookstores, and phone companies respectively
all were subject to different standards of liability.232 Newspapers and
other primary publishers were subject to the same liability as the original
authors because they were in the best position to monitor and control
content.233 Distributors, on the other hand, were only liable for content if
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they had actual or imputed knowledge of illegal, usually defamatory
content which they failed to remove, because although distributers were
not in the best position to monitor the content completely, they were in a
good position to minimize harm.234 The common law figured that
conduits were too attenuated to be held accountable for content, even
though they were implicated in but-for causation.235 The inchoate nature
of the Internet made this framework too difficult to work.236 Courts found
it difficult to characterize ISPs either more similar to bookstores and
libraries, or as publishers with more editorializing power.237 Eventually a
split emerged.238
The court in Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc. refrained from
holding CompuServe liable and characterizing it as a distributor; instead,
the court held it was more like “an electronic, for-profit library” with
minimal editorial control over its publications.239 The state of New York
in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co. decided instead that
the ISP in question should receive the treatment of publishers because it
represented itself to the public as having editorial control over the
content posted on its bulletin boards, and furthermore had software that
allowed them to screen and remove objectionable content.240 This
produced a murk in which, paradoxically, ISPs that attempted
unsuccessfully to remove content subjected themselves to potential
litigation, and those that made no effort whatsoever were free from it.241
The secondary effects of this disparity were that companies would either
give up from mitigating harmful content altogether, or go after it so
strongly that it chilled free speech, contrary to the purpose and the dream
of the Internet.242
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When a proposition to extend “antiharassment, indecency, and
antiobscenity [sic] restrictions” to ISPs was proposed in the Senate, it
was exchanged for immunities within the CDA for “access providers,” or
those who merely serve as a means of access or connection to the
Internet, and for entities that make “good faith” reasonable efforts to
remove content once they were aware.243 This latter defense provided
some middle ground between the two extremities: ISPs were no longer
forced to choose between risking liability and doing nothing at all.244
Additionally, the Good Samaritan provision of Section 230 stated that
“[n]o provider or user of interactive computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.”245 Section 230 goes on to make the
distinction between entities that are “information content provider[s]”
and “interactive computer service[s].”246 The former is immune under
Section 230, the latter is not.247 Courts use a three-pronged test to
determine whether immunity extends to a particular entity: whether an
interactive computer service is used or provided; whether the entity can
be considered an information content provider of the content or activity
in question; and whether the cause of action seeks to hold the entity as a
publisher or speaker of third-party content.248 Thus, for social media
companies, provided the cause of action is proper, because they
obviously provide an interactive computer service, the question of
liability really hinges on whether the online entity was in any way
responsible for the creation or the development of the information.249
Section 230 was subsequently construed broadly in Zeran v.
AOL,250 applying the defense for all three previous common law liability
categories: publishers, distributors, and conduits, and in Blumenthal v.
Drudge, providing the defense despite the fact that AOL retained
minimal editorial rights in a licensing agreement.251 The Ninth Circuit in
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Batzel v. Smith even went so far as to extend immunity to and ISP when
it made minor edits to content and posted it against the author’s
intention.252 These cases increased the scope of Section 230 immunity
by broadening the construction of its second prong’s “information
content provider” language.
The only instances of narrowing this language, which would be a
step in the direction toward making social media companies liable for
their users’ content, were the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Fair Housing
Council v. Roommates.com, LLC and a handful of House bills.253 In
Roommates.com, the court reasoned that a website that designed a
registration process around questions and answers that it provided to
prospective subscribers was thereby responsible for the “development”
of the information and not immune from liability.254 The court included
situations where the website “contributes materially to the alleged
illegality of the conduct,” which enveloped Roommates.com’s
situation.255 House Bill 1865 proposes to amend Section 230 to
eviscerate immunity for and “ensure vigorous enforcement” against users
and providers of Internet services for “sexual exploitation of children or
sex trafficking.”256 It proposes to remove immunity for those who violate
federal or state anti-trafficking laws, or any federal or state law that
provides civil remedies to such victims.257
The Internet changed in a revolutionary way in the two decades
since the passage of the CDA and has permeated most aspects of life. It
no longer requires the same fostering of its growth as it did when it first
started. The current state of Section 230 is that it immunizes ISPs as
long as someone else provided the information.258 It neglects, however,
that often social media companies engage in more proactive roles than
traditional publishers because they make conscious decisions about
where to place advertisements based on who is using the platform,
252
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whereas Section 230 immunity was only intended to protect ISPs that
served as neutral platforms for the dissemination of information.259
If the social media giants were held accountable for their users’
content, they would shut down overnight. This is not desirable.
Nevertheless, the threat of regulation could be enough to keep them in
line. Otherwise, because their liability shield is statutory, a modification
of the statute or the common law doctrine beneath it could permit the
government to allow suits filed against the companies for certain
discrimination situations. That avoids the First Amendment problems of
direct government oversight.
Like the antitrust route, this would not directly make social
media companies liable for selective political censorship. Instead, it
provides leverage to force them to stop censoring, by presenting the
prospect of unmitigated liability. The courts could begin to narrow
Section 230’s liability to exclude social media companies that engage in
political censorship, characterizing them as “internet content providers”
on the grounds that they engage in such practice. However, chastising the
companies for one behavior with a mind to change another is not really a
task suited for the judiciary. Instead, political will can wield the system
of incentives needed to temper the tech giants’ biases. Statutory carveouts specifically aimed at companies that engage in political censorship
would be appropriate modifications to the CDA for the modern Internet
age.
CONCLUSION
The titans of tech have helped usher in an age of unprecedented
human connection. Unprecedented too, is the power they’ve amassed by
their roles in the process. In light of this power, their malleable and
fluctuating standards of use pose a civic issue for liberal societies.
Increased administrative centralization, brought about by the companies’
enormous market share for speech platforms, compromises the robust
debate on which the West prides itself. Whether it be through trust
busting, de-immunization from liability, or the construction of
constitutional rights, what is needed in this area is a revitalization of the
classically liberal values that have made the world freer and more
prosperous. As the world changes evermore quickly, law and
government, which should be the people’s tools for liberty, should be
continually reshaped for the task at hand
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